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Abstract: The objective of this research paper is to highlight reasons of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
slow progress on its Euro-Atlantic path, in order to propose a final solution. The importance of this 
issue is relevant particularly now, because on the one hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its 
official application to join the European Union in February 2016, and on the other hand, it has been 
blocked since April 2010 on its NATO integration path due to the Dayton Peace Agreement 
Constitution’s paradoxes and historical disagreements. Many authors have previously written about 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Euro-Atlantic Integrations but not many of them published academic 
works after the Bosnian formal application for the European Union membership, which represents an 
important step for this post-war country. The main approach used is analytical; which includes 
academic research and understanding of Bosnian contemporary history as a root of current political, 
economic and social crisis. Finally, the result is that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress is not 
satisfactory and moreover, the only solution for the future of Euro-Atlantic Integrations is a reform of 
its current Constitution, but equally a change of the international community’s attitude towards 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper aims to contribute to further academic research in the field of 
international relations regarding future integration of the Western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic bloc.  
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1. Introduction 
Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a country that was one of the six member states 
of Yugoslavia. After the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, a new 
geopolitical map of Europe started to be built. Ethnic tensions started to rise in 
Yugoslavia when its member states such as Slovenia and Croatia wanted to become 
independent. The most complex case regarding the independence was Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as ethnically the most heterogeneous country in the union. Bosnia’s 
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independence referendum took place at the end of February and beginning of 
March 1992 and its result created strong divisions between Bosnian Serbs.1 On the 
one side, many strongly opposed the idea of a referendum and independence for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on the other side, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were 
in favour of independence.2 Nevertheless, the international community recognized 
the country as an independent state on the 6th April 1992, which did not satisfy 
Bosnian Serbs as the majority of them did not even vote in the referendum.3 This 
led to the rise of nationalism and strong ethnic divisions, which resulted in an 
armed conflict, ethnic cleansing, violations of Human Rights and horrific human 
atrocities towards the end of the 20th century.4  
The Bosnian war contributed to the total dissolution of Yugoslavia, and it 
somewhat tested the capacity of the whole international community, resulting in a 
strong reaction to stop the conflict, as the world was not ready for new 
“balkanisation” in this part of Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Bosnian war particularly tested NATO’s 
“raison d’être” in the new epoch of international security. It took more time than 
usual to intervene, as Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first country in history 
where NATO has intervened since its creation. NATO intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina facilitated ceasefire, weakened Serbian troops in Bosnia and led to the 
end of war. New Bosnia was designed by the Dayton Peace Agreement signed on 
the 14th December 1995 by Slobodan Milosević, president of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegović, president of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Franjo 
Tuđman, president of Croatia.  
The Dayton Peace Agreement is highly important for Bosnia because its Annex 4 
represents the current Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Twenty-one years 
post-Dayton, Bosnia is currently in a period of peace; however there still remains 
deep political crisis and social tensions. Moreover, the main priority of Bosnian 
foreign policy is for integration in the European Union and NATO, as well as 
closer cooperation with Interpol due to the war crime fugitives. After more than 
fifty years of socialist regime and after civil war that ravaged the country, Bosnian 
democratic transition that was respectively imagined by the international 
                                                     
1Reuters, (2008). Timeline: What happened during the war in Bosnia?, Retrieved from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-karadzic-bosnia-idUSL2164446420080721. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                      Vol. 9, no. 1/2016 
     42
community has built, as Laurent Geslin declares: “the most bureaucratized state in 
Europe.” (Geslin, 2006, p. 75) The after-war process of state building resulted in 
positive and negative circumstances. At first, we notice the positive aspect is peace, 
and the negative one is a high decentralization that highlights ethnic division within 
the country. Due to the lack of political will for dialogue, Bosnia does not progress 
and moreover, due to its Constitutional ambiguities, the country is usually blocked 
on its Euro-Atlantic integration path. The root of the political inefficiency as the 
reason of unfulfilled tasks required by the international community may be found 
in a so-called identity crisis in post-war countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is.1 Obviously, this country did not have enough time to recover and progress as the 
other Eastern European countries have done after the collapse of their socialist 
regimes, such as; Visegrad 4 group of countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Czech Republic. Identity crisis is one of the core problems because in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina not every citizen considers him or herself as a real Bosnian and does 
not want to contribute to further state building. Paddy Ashdown, a former High 
representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, wrote: “A state with which its citizens 
do not identify, and therefore for which they feel no loyalty, will always be 
vulnerable.” (Ashdown, 2007, p. 10) Moreover, we should take into consideration 
that the majority of Bosnians highly regret the break-up of Yugoslavia. Alexandra 
Stiglmayer writes that: “Many people still long for Yugoslavia, which offered 
decent living standards, freedom to travel, and cushy jobs. Unlike countries in 
Eastern Europe, Bosnia did not want to get rid of socialism – it lost it.”2 Her 
statement is completely true because if we ever visit Bosnia and if talk to the 
people, everyone will confirm that the best times were Yugoslavian times and in 
their words we may notice the presence of that Yugo-nostalgia.  
This introductive historical analysis is important for us to understand the complex 
background of current Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its priorities in 
building a peaceful and prosperous country as a potential candidate to join the 
European Union and NATO. Reality remains that the country progresses slowly on 
its Euro-Atlantic integration path and brings unsatisfactory results in required 
reforms by the European Commission, Council of Europe and NATO. The main 
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issue is that its current Constitution, the so-called Annex 4 of Dayton Peace 
Agreement, produces unexpected paradoxes that could not be foreseen in 1995. 
After analysing these paradoxes and their impact of Bosnian progress, we conclude 
that the last resort for future Euro-Atlantic integrations of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is Constitutional reform. This should also coincide with the change of the European 
Union and NATO’s confusing conditional policies towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as the country itself is blocked, and results in Russia trying to 
enhance its role in both Bosnia and the region of the Western Balkans.  
 
2. Reality of Bosnian Path to the European Union 
In order to better understand this process, we should start with the Preamble of 
Bosnian Constitution which says: “Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent 
peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby 
determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows: (…)” 
(Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 4, Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
1995). This means that Dayton Peace Agreement recognises only three constituent 
peoples for having full civil rights and “Others” as mentioned in the constitutional 
text for not having the same civil rights, which means that the Constitution itself 
makes a difference between the citizenship and national belonging. In practice, we 
can better comprehend this Constitutional problem while analysing Sejdić-Finci 
case. The problem appeared in 2007 when Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, both 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mr. Sejdić of Roma origin and Mr. Finci of 
Jewish), could not be eligible to stand to election because of their origins.1 The 
key of this democratic ambiguity is in the Preamble of Bosnian Constitution, 
which divides its citizens in two categories: constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs) and “Others” (minorities). Two applicants contested the decision of the 
Central Election Commission at the European Court of Human Rights in August 
2007, for not being eligible to stand for election for the Presidency and the House 
of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly in their own country because of their 
origins.2 European Court of Human Rights decided that this case is a violation of 
Article 14 on the Prohibition of Discrimination of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, as well as the violation of Article 3 of Protocol no.1 on Right to 
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Free Elections and equally violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.12 on General 
Prohibition of Discrimination.1 It brought a judgement in 2009 and required 
Bosnian state to reform its legislation on elections and change of Presidency 
composition in Bosnia.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina has Collective Presidency and 
not one president. Collective Presidency counts three chosen representatives of 
Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and this is an 
example of discrimination of minorities in the country. Furthermore, the dialogue 
on the implementation of the judgement has been long and complicated. In 
January 2014, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy – Štefan Füle declared during his visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina: “The 
result of last night's meeting of the party leaders on implementation of the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the 'Sejdić and Finci' case 
was so deeply disappointing. Implementation of this judgment is not a remote 
issue or virtual issue. It is an international obligation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
that, following the will of the Member States, is now a key to progress on the EU 
path. It has real consequences. It means the full entry into force of your 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. It means the possibility for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to submit a credible application for EU membership. And that 
inevitably means more reform and improvements in the country and more 
investments. I want to address this myth that here in Bosnia and Herzegovina we 
were sort of involved in some kind of virtual issue. No, exactly the opposite - the 
issue has very clear consequences on the life of each and every citizen of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.”3 
Even nowadays, when Bosnia and Herzegovina had already submitted its formal 
application to join the European Union, the implementation of the judgment has 
not been completed yet. This result of inefficient implementation of required 
reforms is more than disappointing for the whole international community, and 
without mentioning other issues, we can clearly notice in this case why Bosnia and 
Herzegovina stagnates on its EU path. Nevertheless, it is not only the fault of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tomasz Żornaczuk considers that the European Union 
shows deep enlargement fatigue through its enlargement policy in the Western 
Balkans. (Żornaczuk & Tomasz, 2016, pp. 1-3) More precisely he names its 
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approach as “neither carrots nor sticks” due to Mr. Junker’s change of priorities, 
where the European Union does not even send a clear message to the potential 
candidates when using the principle of conditionality to help them on their EU 
path. (Żornaczuk, 2016, pp. 1-3) Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, he considers 
that: “There is an immediate need to re-think the approach towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and to find solutions on how to involve it in the EU integration 
process, rather than expecting the country to become more centralised and to have 
less parity in key roles—which has failed since Sarajevo became part of the EU 
enlargement policy.” (Żornaczuk, 2016, p. 5) According to him, as a consequence 
of the weak EU role in the Western Balkans, Russia tries to strengthen its position 
as he writes: “The rivalry between Russia and the West turned global to the extent 
that it is more and more often being called a “new Cold War.” On top of that, it 
has become increasingly evident in recent months that, with the decline of Union’s 
interest in the Western Balkans, Russia has been increasing its attempts to re-
establish its influence on this EU periphery.” (Żornaczuk, 2016, p. 5) What was 
very clear from that statement is that he names the Western Balkans as the “EU 
periphery”.  
We all realise that the international community had a huge role in stopping the war 
in Bosnia in 1995, and the important role through peacekeeping missions whose 
result nowadays is absence of conflict, but the reality remains that the Dayton 
Peace Agreement created a state which is on the edge of failure, with double 
federalism and complex territorial, institutional and social partition that does not 
bring positive results. According to Michel Parenti, “Bosnia was stripped of its 
economic and political sovereignty under the IMF and NATO regency and the 
country as it became artificial under international supervision.” (Parenti, 2014, p. 
57). Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles equally with its NATO integrations as the 
country is blocked due to its complex history. Should Bosnia follow the example of 
the Eastern European countries that before entering the European Union firstly 
became members of NATO? This question is going to be discussed in the 
following sections.  
 
3. Difficulties of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its NATO Integration 
Process 
NATO integration is one of the priorities of Bosnian foreign policy. NATO role in 
Bosnia has an important significance for this post-war country because the Alliance 
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has been guaranteeing stability since the end of war. NATO intervened for the first 
time ever in Bosnia under Operation Deny Flight that was an air-led mission by the 
Unites States within the NATO framework.1 After peace establishment by the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO deployed its first peacekeeping mission of 
60.000 soldiers; known as Implementation force or IFOR2 It stayed in Bosnia for 
only one year and was then replaced by a Stabilization force (or SFOR) because 
NATO did not want to leave Bosnia after its first elections due to the risk of new 
conflicts emerging.3 As a result of the state-level establishment of Armed Forces in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 that was seen as a progress, NATO decided to 
leave Bosnia in the hands of the European Union that took these responsibilities 
under the Eufor Althea Mission.4 Additionally, within the framework of Berlin 
Plus Agreement, NATO still has its headquarters in Sarajevo and supports the 
country on its NATO path. Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown its friendship and 
will to cooperate with NATO and it deployed its soldiers to the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009.5 Relations between BiH 
and NATO are promising and fruitful but after its invitation to join the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP), it has been blocked due to the immovable 
defence property issue.6 This represents conditions set by NATO member states to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina before joining the Membership Action Plan stating that all 
immovable defence property has to be declared as the state’s property, more 
precisely the understanding of official declaration of 63 military buildings or 
barracks as the property of Bosnia and Herzegovina.7 Firstly, one issue is that some 
of them are still declared as the property of Yugoslavia or they have never been 
declared during the Yugoslavian times.8 Secondly, the issue is that it has not been 
possible to find an agreement regarding succession and whether these immovable 
defence properties are Entities’ or State’s property.9 To better understand this issue 
we should rely on the Article 1.3 of the Constitution: “Bosnia and Herzegovina 
shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
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Republika Srpska (hereinafter “the Entities”). (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 4, 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995). To clarify this information, the 
entity of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consist of ten Cantons imagined 
during Washington Agreement (1994) and every Canton has its own government 
and Prime Minister, while Republika Srpska is organised at one level and equally 
has its own government and President. At the end, the Presidency of Bosnian state 
represents a Collective Presidency of three people: one Bosniak, one Serb and one 
Croat elected by Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbs in Republic of Srpska for a mandate of four years. This means that the 
state is highly decentralised and this is a key problem during the negotiations 
mentioned above. To illustrate what has just been said about territorial organization 
of Bosnia according to Dayton, we should rely on the following figure taking into 
consideration that the entity called Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists 
of ten Cantons that are not indicated in this map. 
Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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Dayton Peace Agreement created a divided country within two entities where 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian and Croat region) and Republika 
Srpska have completely opposed opinions on NATO integrations. For instance, 
according to a survey done in 2012, Bosnia stands in total at 65% to join NATO, 
taking into consideration that 82% of people from the Federation expressed their 
wish to join the Alliance while the result in Republika Srpska is 38%.1 
Nevertheless, the situation regarding immovable defence property disagreements 
improved a bit since 2012 and where after the decision of Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia, there are now 40 defence properties to be declared, as 23 have already been 
allocated as State property.2 Taking into consideration what has previously been 
mentioned, Republika Srpska led by Milorad Dodik who is inspired by Russian 
brotherhood, seems to block this initiative of defence property allocation under 
state’s possession because the entity wants these properties located on the territory 
of Republic of Srpska to belong to the entity of Republic of Srpska and not to 
Bosnian state. In this state of confusion and inefficiency to find an appropriate 
solution, Alexandra Stiglmayer considers that: “Today, more than five years later, 
the defence property issue has still not been resolved, and Bosnia still has no MAP, 
while Russia has stepped up interference in the Western Balkans, trying to prevent 
the countries from Euro-Atlantic integration.”3 This means that there is always 
someone taking advantage of current situations and that NATO or the European 
Union show a controversial face to the potential candidates for membership. It is 
clear that the Constitution has to be reformed and that the international community 
has to refresh its interests in Bosnia. Dražen Pehar writes: “What can we say about 
the implementation of Dayton? I believe that the only convenient way to describe 
the obstacles to the process of its implementation should not include its ambiguous 
nature, because, properly speaking, those supposed to comply with the Dayton 
Agreement have not yet recognised its ambiguousness, let alone embraced it. They 
instead tend to abuse the agreement’s ambiguous provisions, to insist on their one-
sided interpretation to justify promotion of their out-dated policies that brought 
misery and suffering to the peoples of Bosnia in the recent past.”4 
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After analysing Bosnian position with the EU and NATO, we can clearly see that 
the main issues are Constitutional ambiguities and international pressure on the 
country to make progress when it’s not able to do so. In the following part we will 
propose a solution to this problem.  
 
4. Constitutional Reform and Conditionality Assuagement as the Last 
Resort for a Promising Bosnian Euro-Atlantic Integration Progress 
On the one hand, we can see that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not satisfy 
requirements set by the European Union and NATO because of its Constitutional 
ambiguities, and also because of historical and current disputes. On the other hand, 
we understand that the enlargement policy of the European Union towards Bosnia 
is unclear and unambitious. The use of conditionality in negotiations is something 
well known and normal, but both NATO and the EU should revive their interest in 
Bosnia because of its geopolitical position, due to the current Russian interests and 
Bosnian bloody past. There are two possible solutions for the current crisis in 
Bosnia. Firstly, the Dayton Peace Agreement should be reformed by which it will 
be easier to fulfil requirements of both the EU and NATO. Secondly, the European 
Union should change its enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and 
more precisely its role in Bosnia because it remains unclear and inefficient.  
At first, as many international leaders proposed, there should be a reform of the 
current Dayton Peace Agreement and introduction of so-called Dayton II.1 In order 
to be fully functional representative democracy, Bosnia and Herzegovina should 
reform its Preamble and electoral legislation in order to include and respect rights 
of all its citizens and avoid future cases as the Sejdić-Finci case. Regarding 
territorial organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should be divided in multi-
ethnic regions but not two entities divided according ethnic belongings. Current 
entities should not have the same power, which means that state’s power should be 
more centralized. This means that Bosnia would not be bureaucratized, as it is now. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose population represents a number of around 4 
million inhabitants, has too many institutions and people working in public 
administration, which is extremely costly for the state’s budget. For example, 
according to Laurent Geslin: “For four million inhabitants, there are 1 200 judges 
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and prosecutors, 760 parliamentarians, more than 100 ministers and four levels of 
citizen representation!” (Geslin, 2006, p. 175) At least, if these four million of 
citizens were represented well, the problem would not be that serious. Moreover, 
the Collective Presidency seems not to be functional and it is surely not productive 
to switch Head of Presidency every eight months.1 This should be changed with the 
upmost attention in order to avoid imposition of the one over others, which means 
that there can be one President with functional system of checks and balances. 
Florian Bieber considers that: “If the presidency members are elected by the 
entities without ethnic prefixes, Croats are likely to be unrepresented, and if a 
fourth member is added to the current three to represent “others” (i.e. minorities), 
there is a danger of this position being abused by nationalist parties running token 
minority representatives for the seat. Replacing the presidency with a single 
president (with two or more vice-presidents) would be the best solution, but is one 
to which Croat and Serb parties will be reluctant to agree.”2  
Furthermore, the European Union should send clearer message to Bosnia regarding 
its constitutional reform. Florian Bieber considers that: “The EU has been 
particularly ambivalent about constitutional reform, supporting (although not 
whole-heartedly) the first US-led efforts that failed in April 2006 and then 
subsequently stating that constitutional changes are not a requirement, but are 
necessary. Even if this might be right, it has sown damaging confusion.”3 It is clear 
that the country cannot continue functioning in the way it has done until now and 
we all know that constitutional reform has to be done for the good of everyone and 
it should not be just “necessary” but “mandatory”. Without Constitutional reform 
and according to the results that Bosnia has shown until now, it risks future 
stagnation both internally and externally. In his policy paper Floran Bieber 
proposes how the EU should help Bosnia in order to encourage constitutional 
reform. Firstly, he thinks that: “Constitutional amendments should only be 
introduced through the formal institutional process, not pushed through ad hoc 
meetings, to reduce the risk of spoiling tactics if only party leaders are included”.4 
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Secondly, he considers that: “The goal of constitutional reforms should not be 
state-building by stealth, but addressing the Constitution's shortcomings in terms 
of human rights and facilitating EU accession, to re-establish the Union's 
credibility as a mediator in the reform process.”1 Thirdly, according to him: “The 
EU should steer the process by providing advice and guidance, offering a clear 
menu of options to prepare Bosnia's institutional structure not only for accession 
negotiations but also for membership.”2 We can agree with all these propositions 
except his last point, which is a contrast to our proposition where he respectively 
offers different ideas regarding centralisation: “Reforms should be built on the 
premise that Bosnia is a fully-functional decentralised country, which includes the 
Serb Republic as one of its federal units and a state government which can 
represent Bosnia in the EU.”3 
During the constitutional reform, in order to integrate the EU and NATO, Bosnia 
should reform its internal security level which is the main concern. For the example 
of Germany that urged Bosnia and Herzegovina to introduce the Dayton II because 
of terrorist threats in Bosnia, and number of Bosnian citizens fighting in Syria that 
should be understood seriously.4 We should also take into consideration that the 
Bosnian Ministry of Security should show initiative regarding the spread of 
Wahhabist movement within Bosnian borders, because Wahhabist villages in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a serious threat to security of all Bosnian people 
and Bosnian values.  
Finally, alongside all these reforms, the international community should strengthen 
its presence in Bosnia and re-establish a powerful High Representative taking into 
consideration that the person currently at this position is on the way to lose “raison 
d’être”. Alexandra Stiglmayer writes that: “Between 1998 and 2005, successive 
High Representatives dismissed hundreds of public officials and imposed many 
important laws - not really an exercise in democratic decision-making.”5 
Establishment of powerful High Representative could only bring positive results on 
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Bosnian Euro-Atlantic path and accelerate required and necessary changes while 
putting pressure on political elite to work harder in office.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We can clearly see that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a complete representative 
democracy and that it faces huge democratic paradoxes due to Annex 4 of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, which is basically its Constitution. According to the 
Copenhagen Criteria, we cannot clearly imagine Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a 
part of the European Union, even if the country submitted its formal application to 
join the Union in February 2016. Its European Union path seems very pessimistic 
and the only solution would be a Constitutional reform and an introduction of 
Dayton II. Constitutional ambiguities are equally a problem on the NATO path that 
results in blockages where the country is not able to change anything. Taking into 
consideration that Bosnia’s past was bloody and chaotic, the conditions set by 
NATO and the European Union seem unclear and unfair. In order to progress, there 
is a Bosnian obligation to reform its Constitution, and NATO and the European 
Union should refresh their policies towards Bosnia because of geopolitical 
interests. In order to integrate a Euro-Atlantic bloc more coherently, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina should follow the model of Croatia as well as Visegrad 4 Group of 
countries and firstly integrate with NATO and then the European Union.  
 
6. Future Work 
First of all, years 2015 and 2016 were years of doubt and crisis regarding the 
European Union as a political project and an idea. More precisely, the main 
pressures were refugee crisis, Brexit and economic situation where the European 
Union showed its citizens that it is not a strong political union. The situation is 
deeply confusing, having on the one side certain countries that want to leave and 
on the other side countries that want to enter the European Union. The European 
Union is currently not the same as it used to be until the British citizens decided to 
leave in the referendum whose result represents a turning point for the whole 
European Union. Reality remains that the European Union is passing through 
difficult times and only time will show if it will be ready for enlargements in the 
Western Balkans any time soon.  
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Secondly, NATO faced a period of hybrid threats from Russian Federation during 
the war in Syria, Ukrainian crisis and social tensions in the Baltic countries. 
Moreover, is Russian violation of the Turkish airspace an example of NATO’s 
weaknesses? If NATO is a weak Alliance, then why other countries want to 
become a part of it? There are many questions to ask and answer because we live in 
an interesting time, especially interesting for researchers, analysts and students in 
the field of International Relations and Political Science. Finally, for that reason the 
aim of this paper is to give an idea and contribute to the future research regarding 
the European Union and NATO’s enlargement in the Western Balkans.  
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